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THE LIMITING EFFECT OF DAFFY v DAFFY 2013 1 SACR 42 (SCA)
1 Introduction
The preamble of the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 recognises, inter alia:
“that domestic violence is a serious social evil; that there is a high incidence of domestic violence 
within South African society; that victims of domestic violence are among the most vulnerable 
members of society; that domestic violence takes on many forms; that acts of domestic violence may 
be committed in a wide range of domestic relationships; and that the remedies currently available to 
the victims of domestic violence have proved to be ineffective.”
Domestic violence is a social evil that often occurs behind closed doors. In S v 
Baloyi the constitutional court indicated that:
“All crime has harsh effects on society. What distinguishes domestic violence is its hidden, 
repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple effects on our society and, in particular, on family 
life. It cuts across class, race, culture and geography, and is all the more pernicious because it is so 
often concealed and so frequently goes unpunished” (2000 2 SA 425 (CC) 431C).
The Domestic Violence Act was enacted to accommodate the growing number of 
domestic violence incidents and to rectify the shortcomings of the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. One aspect governed more extensively in terms 
of Act 116 of 1998 is the categories of persons who can apply for a protection order. 
In this regard, Act 116 of 1998 provides an extensive definition of a “domestic 
relationship”. This note will provide a critical evaluation of Daffy v Daffy (2013 1 
SACR 42 (SCA)) with specific reference to the supreme court of appeal’s view that 
the brothers in question were not in a domestic relationship. It will be argued that 
the decision has a limiting effect and defeats the purpose of Act 116 of 1998, which 
was to provide protection to a broader ambit of persons. In order to illustrate this 
argument, reference will be made to several consequent issues pertaining to the 
argument presented above. Recommendations will also be provided.
2 Facts
The matter involved two brothers (both businessmen) who did not share a common 
household. Much of the dispute involved their interests in Core Mobility (Pty) Ltd. 
The appellant (Cristopher Redden Daffy) had worked at Core Mobility for a period 
of about ten years until a disciplinary enquiry resulted in the termination of his 
employment. Prior to the termination of his employment, the relationship between 
the brothers soured, with the respondent (Stephen Redden Daffy) suspecting the 
appellant of committing irregularities and abusing his position. This resulted in 
arguments between them and on one occasion the appellant threatened to assault 
and financially ruin the respondent (par 4). On the advice of his attorney, the 
respondent instituted a disciplinary inquiry, which the appellant did not attend and 
he was consequently dismissed. The appellant contended that he held 50% of the 
company’s shares and launched high court proceedings for an order declaring that 
to be the case. Relying on those proceedings, it was argued by the respondent that 
the papers that were served upon him at work illustrated a course of conduct by 
the appellant which, together with certain threats and other conduct relevant to the 
company and their business relationship, justified a protection order being granted 
in his favour (par 3). 
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There is quite a bit of history regarding the litigation between the parties. The 
respondent initially applied for an interim protection order against the appellant 
in the Randburg magistrate’s court. The appellant opposed the confirmation of the 
interim order and after several postponements, the matter went to trial. After hearing 
evidence it was found that the respondent failed to make out a case. The respondent 
then proceeded to appeal, which was upheld and resulted in the confirmation of the 
protection order. With leave to appeal, the appellant sought to set the protection 
order aside on the grounds that the dispute between them was of a commercial 
nature and not a matter that ought to be dealt with in terms of Act 116 of 1998 (par 
1 and par 5).
3 Judgment
In order to obtain a protection order in terms of Act 116 of 1998, the complainant 
and the respondent have to be in a domestic relationship. A domestic relationship 
refers to, inter alia, a relationship between a complainant and respondent where they 
are family members related by consanguinity, affinity or adoption (see s 1 of Act 116 
of 1998 which provides the definition of a “domestic relationship”). Thus, because 
they were brothers, the respondent argued that they were in a domestic relationship 
and, therefore, that he qualified as a complainant in terms of the act.
The supreme court of appeal, however, did not agree. According to the court, the 
provision is broadly formulated, in that no degree of relationship, consanguineous 
or otherwise, is mentioned. Also, the concept of “family” is extremely wide (par 
7). To illustrate, it was questioned whether distant cousins, who have nothing 
in common other than sharing a mutual ancestor, would qualify as being in a 
domestic relationship. To the court’s mind, this question could not be answered 
in the affirmative (par 7). The court’s dissatisfaction with the broad nature of the 
definition resulted in the court attempting to answer how the provision should be 
interpreted. As far as the interpretation of legislation is concerned, it was said 
that the underlying purpose of a provision has to be considered in order to avoid a 
purely literal meaning that would result in absurdity (par 8). Placing reliance on the 
Baloyi case, it was highlighted that the concept of domestic violence is commonly 
understood as being violence within the confines of the family unit, which is often 
hidden from view by reason of the helplessness of the victim and the position of 
power of the abuser. Furthermore, the common meaning of “domestic” pertains to 
the home, house, or household, in other words, one’s home or family affairs (with 
reference to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (6 ed) 
– par 8). “Family”, according to the court, has as one of its general connotations 
“the body of persons who live in one house or under one head, including parents, 
children, servants etc”. Thus, if one has regard to the ordinary connotation of a 
“domestic relationship” it would involve persons who share a common household 
(with reference to the Oxford English Dictionary (2 ed) – par 8). 
While the court acknowledged that the legislature envisaged that the definition 
bear a wider meaning than the above for purposes of the act, it was not, in the court’s 
opinion, intended that a mere blood relationship, even if close, would in itself be 
sufficient (par 8). Accordingly, adhering to a definition “regardless of subject-matter 
and context might work the gravest injustice by including cases which were not 
intended to be included” (par 8).
Furthermore, other provisions under the definition of a domestic relationship 
require some form of association other than mere consanguinity to be regarded as 
a domestic relationship (par 8). Thus, the definition is poorly framed and incapable 
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of bearing a precise meaning. While stating this, the supreme court of appeal 
nevertheless found it unnecessary to attempt to determine what would be required 
for such a relationship to be regarded as a domestic relationship (par 9). In casu the 
respondent relied solely on the fact that he and the appellant are brothers, which in 
itself was according to the court, insufficient. Taking into account their respective 
ages and the fact that they had not shared a common household for many years, 
the court held that it would be absurd to conclude that the mere fact that they were 
brothers resulted in them being in a “domestic relationship” for purposes of the act 
(par 9). Since the respondent failed to show that he was in a domestic relationship, 
he was not entitled to rely on the protection afforded in terms of the act. Although 
the respondent failed in this, the court nevertheless addressed why the respondent 
also failed to show that there was domestic violence. Thus, even if the respondent 
had managed to convince the court that he was in a domestic relationship with the 
appellant, he would have failed on this ground. This aspect, however, is not relevant 
for purposes of this note and will not be discussed further other than to mention that 
the appeal was upheld. 
4 Analysis of the judgment and consequent aspects
The act was enacted as a means to combat the inadequate remedies available to 
victims of domestic violence in terms of both the common law and the Prevention 
of Family Violence Act (Kruger “Addressing domestic violence: to what extent does 
the law provide effective measures?” 2004 JJS 156; Gadinabokao Shortcomings of 
the South African Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 in Comparative Perspective 
(2016 LLM diss UP) 11). Another result the act aimed to achieve was to broaden 
the ambit of persons to which the act applied. Unlike the Prevention of Family 
Violence Act, which focused on parties who are or were married to each other, but 
also heterosexual cohabitants, Act 116 of 1998 has a much broader ambit (Kruger 
160; Gadinabokao 11). 
4.1 Domestic violence among siblings
There is no universally accepted definition of sibling violence regardless of the 
fact that it may be the most prevalent form of family violence (Le Roux-Kemp 
“Intra-family violence or domestic violence, a domestic relationship or merely a 
case of sibling rivalry: where to draw the line? 2013 Internal Review of Law 2; 
Eriksen and Jensen “A push or a punch: distinguishing the severity of sibling 
violence” 2009 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 183; Button and Gealt “High 
risk behaviours among victims of sibling violence” 2010 J Family Violence 131). 
Simonelli et al mentioned that a reason why sibling violence may be overlooked 
is because it is so common and is therefore rarely viewed as family violence and 
it is sometimes dismissed by parents as sibling rivalry (“Abuse by siblings and 
subsequent experiences of violence within the dating relationship” 2002 Journal 
of Interpersonal Violence 105-106). Furthermore, violence among siblings also 
appears to be the least studied (Eriksen and Jensen 183, Le Roux-Kemp 2). The law 
commission recommended that the term “family” be defined to include siblings and 
in-laws who share a common residence or a similar close relationship. Based on this, 
Le Roux-Kemp argues that, if one has regard to this aspect, the supreme court of 
appeal’s statement that more than a mere blood relationship is required seems to be 
correct (7). However, while this may be so, and the law commission recommended 
it, Act 116 of 1998 itself does not contain a definition of family.
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4.2 Extent of protection 
The court mentions in the case “that some form of association other than mere 
consanguinity” is required in the remainder of the definition, but fails to elaborate 
what this other form of association entails. It is submitted that this was an oversight 
on the part of the court, since if one has regard to some of the other categories 
under the relevant definition, it is not apparent what the additional “requirements” 
could be. The failure on the part of the court to elaborate is unfortunate, more so 
since the court indicates that it was not necessary to determine the exact meaning 
of the definition. This is problematic in that this could impact the remainder of the 
categories, since it does not focus only on a relationship by blood, but affinity and 
adoption as well. 
Affinity is the relationship that arises by virtue of marriage. In the context of 
family law, the rules dictate which relatives of one’s ex-spouse you are prohibited 
or allowed to marry. According to article 8 of the Political Ordinance of 1580, 
you are not permitted to marry any of your ex-spouse’s relatives in the direct line 
(ascendants and descendants). (See Heaton and Kruger South African Family Law 
(2015) 28.) Marriage between those persons who are related through affinity in the 
collateral line (blood relations who share a common ancestor but are not ascendants 
and descendants of one another) is not prohibited (Heaton and Kruger 28 who refer 
to s 28 of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961). In essence, affinity is the relationship that is 
created between a spouse and the blood relations of the other spouse. Thus, affinity 
refers to one’s “in-laws”. Based on the court’s interpretation of blood relationships, 
that would mean that, in order to rely on Act 116 of 1998, in-laws would have to share 
a common household in order to rely on the protection in the act, unless the need 
for sharing a common household is not relevant in the context of a relationship that 
arises through affinity. It would therefore be interesting to see how this aspect will 
be interpreted in future, since it cannot be said that most in-laws share a common 
household. It would also be required of a court to elaborate on the extent to which 
affinity applies: in other words, does it refer only to one’s parent in-laws and/or 
sibling in-laws, or other relations in the collateral line as well?
Adoption is the legal relationship that arises between an adoptive parent and an 
adopted child. In terms of section 242(2)(c) and (3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 
an adoptive parent becomes the parent of the child for all intents and purposes. 
Thus, an adoptive parent cannot marry an adopted child. Based on the court’s 
interpretation, Act 116 of 1998 should extend to this relationship only while the 
parties live together. Thus, the protection afforded in terms of Act 116 of 1998 should 
then come to an end upon the adopted child moving out of the common home. A 
court interpreting the provision otherwise would amount to differentiation between 
relations arising through blood, affinity and adoption, which would then require a 
satisfactory justification. This judgment therefore, was the perfect opportunity for 
the court to give context to address the obvious anomalies created by the judgment.
To add to the court’s statement that the other aspects of the definition require 
“some form of association”, reference is made to the actual provision. Section 1 of 
Act 116 of 1998 reads: 
“‘domestic relationship’ means a relationship between a complainant and a respondent in any of the 
following ways: 
(a)   they are or were married to each other, including marriage according to any law, custom or 
religion; 
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(b)   they (whether they are of the same or of the opposite sex) live or lived together in a relationship 
in the nature of marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to each other, or are not able 
to be married to each other; 
(c)   they are the parents of a child or are persons who have or had parental responsibility for that child 
(whether or not at the same time); 
(d)  they are family members related by consanguinity, affinity or adoption; 
(e)   they are or were in an engagement, dating or customary relationship, including an actual or 
perceived romantic, intimate or sexual relationship of any duration; or 
(f)  they share or recently shared the same residence.”
As far as category (a) is concerned, reference is made to those persons who are 
or were married. With regard to those who are no longer married, would they be 
excluded if they no longer share a home? Could it similarly be argued that having 
been married does not suffice for purposes of Act 116 of 1998? Or do ex-spouses find 
themselves in a more favourable position than siblings who no longer live together? 
There is no longer a relationship, other than possibly being co-parents, that is if they 
share children. 
Category (e) is even more interesting in that it refers to an engagement, dating or 
customary relationship including an actual or perceived romantic, intimate or sexual 
relationship of any duration. Any duration implies that there is no set time that the 
parties needed to date in order to be protected in terms of the act. Furthermore, 
this part of the provision does not require that the parties should have shared a 
home in order to rely on Act 116 of 1998. Again, this illustrates the need for the 
court to elaborate on the qualification “some form of association” that is required in 
respect of the remaining categories. Furthermore, the other provisions specifically 
mention live or lived together, which again shows that sharing a common household 
is not required. It can be assumed that many siblings lived together; thus, it is not 
understood why the court limited the application of Act 116 of 1998 in the context 
of siblings. While there may be strong arguments that there is a need to limit the 
provision, for example, by excluding distant cousins, the court nevertheless failed 
to acknowledge that its interpretation of the provision excludes many applicants. 
Also, if one has regard to the court’s statement that a “domestic relationship” entails 
sharing a common household, that would mean that all categories or persons who 
lived together should also be excluded from the protection of Act 116 of 1998.
Le Roux-Kemp highlights that there are arguments that a broader definition is 
required in that the notion of family goes beyond marriage and that cohabitation 
should not be a prerequisite (7 and see South African Law Commission Research 
Paper on Domestic Violence (1999)). It is evident that the extent of the applicability of 
the proposed act was previously questioned by the South African Law Commission 
(“Family Violence” Issue Paper 2, Project 100 (1996) 5):
“The further question arises whether the Act should not be amended to include family members that 
fall beyond the immediate family scope, for example an aunt, uncle, niece or nephew. There seems 
to be the argument that such an amendment would negate the spirit of the Act which is to prevent 
violence between parties living together as a family” (see also Research Paper 41). 
The recommendation provided:
“[T]here should be comprehensive inclusion of all those exposed to the risk of domestic violence 
…. It is conceded that a broad definition of the class of persons eligible to seek protection could be 
criticised for including relationships that fall outside the ‘domestic’ realm. However, since the aim is 
to provide protection from violence, a definition which is criticised for being too broad is preferable 
to a definition that is criticised for being too narrow. If a person who arguably falls outside the 
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domestic realm is protected by invoking the provisions of domestic violence legislation, it would 
be a small price to pay, if any, for the assurance that victims who ought to qualify for the intended 
protection are entitled to apply for relief” (Research Paper 56).
Based on the above, it may be necessary for the court to reconsider its judgment in this 
regard. The court also failed to take cognisance of the objectives and foundational 
principles of Act 116 of 1998, one of the former being the acknowledgment that 
domestic violence can occur in a wide range of domestic relationships (Le Roux-
Kemp 4). 
4.3 The position in New Zealand
In the research paper by the South African Law Commission, reference was made to 
several jurisdictions in respect of the categories of relationships to which protection 
is afforded. One such jurisdiction is New Zealand. In respect of family members 
New Zealand does not appear to require the existence of a common household. 
Chauhan v Grewal (2017 NZFC 8738) involved a dispute between a brother and 
sister as a consequence of the issues between their children. The court held that the 
siblings were “family members” in terms of the domestic violence act, and thus, 
in a domestic relationship (par 3). No reference was made to the parties sharing a 
household or being required to share a household in order to qualify. 
The relevant provisions contained in the New Zealand act can go a long way to 
assist in defining the extent of the applicability of Act 116 of 1998, which is broader 
than the current definition provided in the latter act. If this is not the approach to 
be followed, Act 116 of 1998 should still be amended to give effect to the alleged 
conundrum created by the judgment. It is also to be noted that the Domestic Violence 
Act 86 of 1995 of New Zealand, which was referred to in the Research Paper, has 
since been amended. Reference will therefore be made to the Family Violence Act 
2018, which came into effect on 1 July 2019 (nzfvc.org.nz (15-09-2019)). While this 
may be so, cases decided prior to the Family Violence Act will be discussed, since 
these cases provide insight into the meaning of some of the terms used in both New 
Zealand acts.
In terms of section 12 of the New Zealand act the meaning of “family relationship: 
general” is provided: “For the purposes of this Act, a person (A) is in a family 
relationship with another person (B) if A – (a) is a spouse or partner of B; or (b) is a 
family member of B; or (c) ordinarily shares a household with B (see also s 13); or 
(d) has a close personal relationship with B (see also s 14).”
Section 13 goes further by providing the meaning of “family relationship: sharing 
household”: 
“For the purposes of section 12(c), a person (A) is not regarded as sharing a household with another 
person (B) by reason only of the fact that — (a) A has, with B,— (i) a landlord-tenant relationship; 
or (ii) an employer-employee relationship; or (iii) an employee-employee relationship; and (b) A and 
B occupy a common dwellinghouse (whether or not other people also occupy that dwellinghouse).”
The act also provides for the meaning of “family relationship: close personal 
relationship” in section 14 as well as factors to guide a court in determining whether 
the relationship can be regarded as a close personal relationship:
“ (1) A person (A) is not regarded as having a close personal relationship with another person (B) under 
section 12(d) by reason only of the fact that A has, with B,—
(a)  an employer-employee relationship; or
(b)  an employee-employee relationship.
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(2) A person (A) is not prevented from having a close personal relationship with another person (B) 
under section 12(d) by reason only of the fact that A has, with B, a recipient of care-carer relationship.
(3) In determining whether a person (A) has a close personal relationship with another person (B) 
under section 12(d), the court must have regard to—
(a)  the nature and intensity of the relationship, and in particular—
 (i)  the amount of time A and B spend together:
 (ii)  the place or places where that time is ordinarily spent:
 (iii)  the manner in which that time is ordinarily spent:
(b)  the duration of the relationship.
(4) Despite subsection (3)(a), it is not necessary for a person (A) to have a sexual relationship with 
another person (B) in order for A to have a close personal relationship with B.
(5) Subsections (2), (3), and (4) do not limit the matters to which a court may have regard in 
determining, under section 12(d), whether a person has a close personal relationship with another 
person”.
Based on the decision by the supreme court of appeal, the provision may be too 
broad, as it extends to “family members”, whereas the court alludes to the fact that 
Act 116 of 1998 can certainly not extend to, for example, distant cousins. While it 
is submitted that Act 116 of 1998 should extend to all family members, if this is not 
accepted, then the current provision should be amended accordingly. In line with 
the court’s judgment, the amendment could read: “‘domestic relationship’ means a 
relationship between a complainant and a respondent in any of the following ways: 
… (d) they are family members related by consanguinity, affinity or adoption who 
share a common household.” This definition would, it is submitted, defeat the entire 
purpose of Act 116 of 1998, which was enacted, as mentioned earlier, to among other 
things, extend the applicability of the act. 
The New Zealand Act provisions furthermore not only state what a domestic 
relationship is, but also provide when the parties are not regarded as sharing a 
common household as well as factors to consider to assess the closeness of the 
relationship. To assist in the applicability of the act, regard may be had to the 
provisions relating to what constitutes a “close personal relationship”. It should, 
however, be highlighted that case law illustrates that there is debate regarding the 
meaning of a “close personal relationship”, and, thus, not every relationship will 
fall within this category, which then gives effect to the supreme court of appeal’s 
statement that the act cannot extend to all types of relationships. In RCT v HB FAM 
(2008 NZFC 51), the court delved into the question of whether or not the relationship 
between R and H constituted a “domestic relationship” for purposes of the 1995 act. 
The relevant parties had known each other for a number of years, and, thus, it was 
argued on behalf of R that a domestic relationship existed between them. The court 
quoted extensively from Dudley v Brooks (1998 17 FRNZ), where the latter court 
adopted the analysis in Wyatt v Eldershaw (FC, New Plymouth, FP043/222/97, 24 
July 1997) regarding a “close personal relationship” (par 15):
“A ‘close personal relationship’ is the only criterion of ‘domestic relationship’ which contains 
no express requirement of domesticity in the sense of relationship as ‘partners’ (s 4(1)(a), family 
membership (subpara (b)), or ordinarily sharing a household (subpara (c)). There has been some 
difference of judicial opinion as the Family Court has struggled to relate particular fact situations to 
what could be supposed to have been the legislative intention in using the expression. What has been 
classed as a conservative view is that an element of domesticity is ordinarily required (see D v B 1996 
NZFLR 812; Willeman v Maney 1997 NZFLR 280). Another view adopts a broader concept which 
depends basically on whether a situation exists between the applicant and the respondent in which 
protection is appropriate having regard to the social objectives of the Act (see T v H 1996 NZFLR 
865, Schlichting v Punnet 1997 NZFLR 181, also reported as S v P (1996) 15 FRNZ 225, S v M 1997 
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NZFLR 210). With respect, as I pointed out in the sequel to T v H (T v H (No 2) 16/10/1996, Judge 
Inglis QC, FC New Plymouth FP043/302/96) such a test may be criticised as being imprecise, but 
I held in effect that the actions of the respondent in that case, an obsessive stalker who persistently 
attempted to force a close personal relationship on an applicant who did not want it, had by his own 
behaviour created a ‘close personal relationship’ with her so as to support a final protection order. 
I carried the issue somewhat further than any of the previous cases in M V P 1997 15 FRNZ 539; 
1997 NZFLR 597 where I held that a close personal relationship was capable of being created by the 
respondent’s persistent harassing and threatening conduct towards the applicant apparently as part of 
a neighbourhood feud. 
 There remain a difficulty in interpreting ‘close personal relationship’ in a way that reconciles the 
statutory context of that expression (including the various criteria of ‘closeness’ referred to in s 4(2) 
to (4) with the object of providing protection for an applicant faced by a respondent’s unacceptable 
behaviour. It seems, however, that whether or not there is a ‘close personal relationship’ must be a 
question of fact and degree and requires an objective assessment of the relationship, extending to 
the actions of the respondent and the consequences and implications of those actions which may 
themselves create a close personal relationship because of the impact they are intended to have on the 
applicant. In Schlichting v Punnet 1997 NZFLR 181, 187, also reported as S v P (1996) 15 FRNZ 225, 
231 Judge Adams speaks of the term ‘domestic relationship’ as a term: ‘used by the Act to describe 
a sufficient and appropriate nexus between parties in a context which may call for protection from 
violence.’ With respect, I would not question that precise encapsulation.”
The evidence in casu was limited as to the nature, quality and extent of the 
relationship. While the parties knew each other for a significant period of time, 
there was no evidence of them having regular or significant contact or more than a 
casual friendship (par 19). Furthermore, the evidence did not indicate that they were 
best friends (par 20); instead, it was indicated that they were past friends (par 22). 
According to the court, the expression “close personal relationship” requires more, 
and while the categories are open-ended, the relationship between the men, both 
past and present did not constitute a close personal relationship (par 23). 
These provisions as well as the decision discussed above could, it is submitted, 
assist the court in establishing whether the relationship in question is close enough 
to constitute a domestic relationship if no common household is shared. 
5 Conclusion
While it may be argued that the purpose of Act 116 of 1998 is to focus on the 
“domestic” element, it is nevertheless argued that a common household should not 
be the basis to rely on Act 116 of 1998. The court’s judgment does indeed limit 
the applicability of the act and requires clarification on the part of the supreme 
court of appeal. The court assumed that violence happens only in the confines of a 
home, when many victims do not share a home but are in fact victims of domestic 
violence. It may further be argued that the court’s judgment relates only to siblings, 
but this cannot be so, as it would amount to differentiation between certain classes 
of persons. While it may be necessary to limit the scope of who may make use of 
Act 116 of 1998, it is evident, at least in the law reform commission’s opinion, that 
not doing so would be a price they were willing to pay to have a broader definition 
than one that is too limiting (Research Paper 56). In this regard, the provisions 
of the New Zealand Act would be of great assistance in providing guidelines on 
the possible amendment of the current provision. If this is not the route to be 
followed, Act 116 of 1998 should still be amended to give effect to the supreme 
court of appeal’s decision and to clarify the position regarding the relationships of 
affinity and adoption. However, before embarking on this route, it may be necessary 
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to research the issue of sibling violence, which, as mentioned earlier, is one of the 
least studied areas. The amendment would also require the amendment of the other 
categories where no reference to a common household is made.
L MANIE
University of the Western Cape
DIE ONSKENDBAARHEID VAN DIE BELANG VAN PRIVAATEIENDOMSREG
“Das Eigentum wird von den Menschen ausgeübt nicht um der Sache willen, an welcher es zusteht, 
sondern um des menschlichen Bedürfnisses willen, welches durch die Sache befriedigt wird. Das 
recht an der Sache wird verletzt, nicht bloß wenn die Integrität der Sache beschädigt wird, sodaß 
sie aus diesem Grunde nicht mehr dem Bedürfnis, für welches sie bestimmt ist, so dienen kann wie 
im unverletzten Zustände; sondern auch dann, wenn die Benutzbarkeit der Sache für Menschen aus 
einem Grunde verhindert oder erschwert wird, welcher sich gegen die Menschen selbst richtet, deren 
Bedürfnis durch die an dieser Stelle befindliche Sache befriedigt werden soll” RG, 1. Zs 19-03-1882, 
RGZ 1882, 61 217 219
 (Die uitoefening van die inhoudsbevoegdhede van eiendomsreg deur die reghebbende geskied nie 
ter wille van die sake as objekte van dié saaklike regte nie, maar ter wille van die reghebbendes wat 
daarmee hul tersake behoeftes met hul eiendom bevredig in ooreenstemming met die grondbeginsel van 
’n vreedsame ordening van die gemeenskap deur afweging van regtens beskermingswaardige belange. 
Die reg van die reghebbende op sy saak word geskend nie bloot wanneer die objek fisies beskadig of 
aangetas word en die saak daarna nie meer optimaal aan die doel daarvan vir die reghebbende kan 
voldoen nie, maar ook dan wanneer die reghebbende in die uitoefening van sy inhoudsbevoegdhede 
belemmer word deur niereghebbendes en die belemmering gerig is teen die reghebbende en nie teen sy 
saak as objek van sy saaklike reg nie.)
        
